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Abstract: The business of real estate is but a subset of the wider investment
markets and macroeconomic trends will significantly shape the way real estate
investment decisions are made. The McKinsey Institute is a global economic
consultancy firm providing cutting-edge research on a wide range of
macroeconomic and business trends. This article reviews macroeconomic trends
that they believe will transform the global economy. McKinsey research show that
“over two-thirds of organic growth of western companies can be attributed to
being in the right markets and geographies” and “companies that ride the tide
succeed and those that swim against it usually struggle” (Davis and Stephenson
2006). Identifying these trends will help organizations and corporations navigate
their way to success.

Over the next twenty years the share of the world GDP will
shift dramatically. Currently, Western Europe accounts for
30% of world GDP and Asia (excluding Japan) accounts for
13%. Growth rates are expected to merge by 2025 while the
US will still account for the largest share of world output.
(Davis and Stephenson 2006).
In a survey of over 100 companies since 1980, McKinsey
Global Institute estimate that global financial stock (equities,
bonds and bank deposits) totals $118 trillion and this could
increase to $200 trillion by 2010. However, 80% of this
stock is generated in four areas: the U.S. the euro area, Japan
and the UK while 37% of global financial stock is dominated
by the US. (Farrell, Key A.M., Shavers 2005).
Wht does the growth in financial markets tell us about global
wealth? Economists call the ratio of financial stock to GDP
(or the underlying economy) ‘financial depth’. GDP reflects
current prices or the value of world output as measured in
today’s prices. The value of financial assets equals the
present value of the cashflows that they generate in the

future. For Farrell et al., the present value of financial stock
has grown to almost three times the value of GDP from an
amount roughly equaling GDP in 1980 (Farrell, Marcheva,
Shavers 2005). In terms of real estate investments, financial
deepening is positive because it means more liquid markets
for savings and investments. However, as the authors make
clear, financial depth does not give us any indication of the
strength of an economy or its wealth. The financial depth of
the US for instance is twice that of Norway but the US and
Norway have similar per capita GDP. Furthermore Japan has
great financial depth but is riddled with non-performing
bank loans and bad debts (Farrell et al 2005).
An interesting finding of McKinsey’s research is that nearly
50% of the growth in global financial assets from 1993 to
2003 is funded by debt. It seems that Ireland is not the only
country with very high levels of debt. Debt issues have
increased in all global regions with corporate debt showing
fastest growth. (MGI global financial stock database 2006).
The McKinsey Global Institute, however, point out some
interesting regional variations. For example, France, Japan
and Italy have greater growth in government debt because
of large government deficits whereas corporate debt is the
salient feature of growth in UK debt. Interestingly,
securitisation of assets has become an important source of
debt particularly in the US and Germany. Farrell et al.
estimate that 36% of the overall increase in debt securities
in the US and Germany is due to the growth in the
securitisation of assets. In contrast, 4% in the UK, less than
1% in France and less than 2% in Italy’s growth in debt
securities results from securitisation. McKinsey notes that
the rest of the world is far behind the trend in the US
indicating significant growth prospects in this market. For
example mortgage backed securitisation accounts for 76%
of overall asset securitisation in the US. (MHI global financial
database).
The US will remain the biggest financial market while the
euro area (because of greater integration) will increase its

share. Japan will become less significant in the global
financial hub while China’s importance will grow. The
Chinese economy accelerated in the 1980’s driven mainly
by manufacturing and foreign direct investment. China
sucked in 8.3% of the world’s FDI of $53billion, more than
any other country. (Farrell, Khanna, Sinha, Woetzel 2006).
In contrast growth rates in India took off in the 1990’s with
little government assistance or foreign direct investment
(Khanna 2006). However both countries face structural
problems. China is riddled with bad bank loans while India
has very poor infrastructure indicating that companies that
rely on just-in-time inventories will be disadvantaged
(Farrell 2006).
Significantly for real estate investment and despite the
demonstrations against globalization, McKinsey research
shows cross border financial activity is growing. Cross
border capital flows have tripled since 1995. This includes
bank lending across borders and foreign purchases of equity
and debt (Farrell et al 2006).
The Pensions Time-Bomb:
The populations of developed economies are ageing. The
pensions and health care crises that this will generate will
mean unprecedented tax increases. The only way this can
be averted is through new higher levels of public sector
efficiency and productivity. If no action is taken to deal with
this impending crisis the fall in global financial wealth will
have devastating effects on global savings and investments
(Farrell, Ghai and Shavers 2006).
As the median age of populations increase (and save less)
and because younger populations are less frugal, global
savings rates will tumble. In 20 years time world household
financial wealth will be $31 trillion less if action is not taken
to deal with the pensions crisis. (Farell et al 2006).
Will a fall in the savings ratios lead to an increase in interest
rates? For Farrell et al this need not necessarily be the case.

They point out that some economists suggest that there will
be less demand for mortgages, less government expenditure
in infrastructure and less investment by business in capital
equipment to keep pace with a fall in population. On the
other hand, the authors suggest, a falling savings ratio could
mean persistent budget deficits by governments. This will
result in higher public sector demand for money on the
money and capital markets and consequently higher interest
rates. The effect will be ‘crowding-out’ (something the Irish
economy was familiar with in the 1980s) of private sector
investments.
What needs to be done? The authors of this report provide
evidence that raising the retirement age, increasing the birth
rate or easing restrictions on immigration will not be
sufficient. Indeed more liberal immigration policies won’t be
effective because immigrants are a small fraction of the
country’s population. Thus allowing more immigrants would
add a tiny fraction to a country’s financial assets.
Similarly, according to McKinsey’s research promoting
population growth through child tax credits and generous
maternity leave would have negligible effect by 2024
because households do not reach their prime years until
middle age (30 to 50). In fact, they say, these policies “would
make the situation worse by adding child dependency to a
workforce already supporting a larger number of elderly”
(Farrell et al).
Furthermore, the authors contend that concentrating on
economic growth (and by extension higher incomes) won’t
solve the problem. The important relationship is between
income and savings and, unfortunately, as income rises so
does consumption. As an example, Farrell suggests that a 1%
increase in average income growth, a massive increase,
would reduce the financial gap in the United States by just
10%.
McKinsey’s solution to the impending financial gap brought
about by ageing populations is two fold. First of all

households and governments must increase their savings
and secondly economies must boost the rate of return on
assets. As an example the authors provide evidence that
increasing the rate of return on the $56 trillion savings in
the US, UK, Germany, Japan and Italy would go a long way to
sway the impending global financial gap. For example, if
Germany were to increase its return on its financial assets to
0% from the historic average of minus 1.1% it would
“completely eliminate its financial shortfall” (Farrell et al
2006). The researchers’ solution to improving rates of
return is greater market efficiency and policies that promote
competition, financial regulation, tax incentives for
productive saving and investor education.
An interesting finding from the research is that in many
countries today younger generations earn more and save
less than their parents’ generation. The research suggests
that if the younger generation in Japan, for instance, saved as
much as their elders while continuing to earn high incomes,
one-quarter of Japan’s wealth shortfall would be eliminated
by 2024.
In addition, public sector saving, by controlling fiscal deficits,
will be critical in averting the financial gap. This can be done
more efficiently through gains in public sector productivity.
However, improved productivity is not synonymous with
layoffs and cutbacks (Dohrmann and Mendonca 2006). In
fact layoffs can lead to poorer productivity and poorer
services. Productivity can be achieved by improving the
quality and quantity of output. On of the ten principles of
economics is the key to wealth creation. In the public sector,
for example, reducing crime and improving educational
outcomes can lead to improved productivity. Reliable data
on government productivity is not available in most
countries but estimates in the US suggest that if the gap
between US private and public sector productivity could be

halved, it would increase public sector productivity by 5R%
to 15%.
Dohrmann and Mendonca, however, ask whether it is fair to
compare private and public sector productivity. They note
the contribution of economist Wiliam Beaumol who wrote
that services might lag behind manufacturing because of the
labour intensive nature of their work. As Dohrmann and
Mendonca put it – “ it will always take the same amount of
time for a teacher to read a story or for a nurse to administer
a shot”. For Beaumol, since public sector provides services
such as education, policing and health care there is little
scope for productivity gains.
However analogies do exist between private and public
sector productivity. For instance, Dohrmann and Mendonca
cite the analogy between processing social welfare
payments and the processing of insurance claims. In
addition, they suggest that the management of real estate is
much the same in the public sector as in the private sector.
In these areas the private sector has found ways to boost
their productivity and it seems plausible that the public
sector can do the same. However, the McKinsey research is
clear in that calls for public productivity should not be used
as an excuse for “union bashing” – often the case with rightwing ideologues. It simply means that greater efficiency will
mean more resources and money will be available to fund
the impending pension and health care needs.
The biggest obstacle to improving productivity in the public
sector is the lack of competition. The MGI, in research
conducted ten years ago, found that private sector
companies that had the lowest productivity were usually
monopolies. Their conclusion is that without competition,
managers will have little incentive to take on risk. This is
concurrent with another of the ten principles in economics
that people respond to incentives. For example,

governments can create competition by outsourcing back
office services such as real estate management and
procurement. Performance measurement management
systems and benchmarking surveys make governments
more accountable. Information programmes to citizens of
the need for public sector transparency and accountability
will force public sector productivity because it is citizens
that will be saved from the financial time-bomb that they
face.
So which is it to be? Higher taxes and lower quality of output
to finance the financial gap or improved public sector
productivity. To help answer this very important it is
important to remember that it was the public sector that
was responsible for some of the world’s most amazing
management feats from smallpox eradication, bullet trains
and space flight.
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